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There is an extraordinary degree of similarity
throughout the region in the nature of the policy
problems that have arisen, such as in rural
development . . . and in the national response to
them.
Focus . . . is on the efficiency with which resources
are used. Economic growth implies using a
country's scarce resources. . . more efficiently
produce those things which it can best produce
compared to other countries . . . with the least use
of limited resources. . . policy making inevitably
has to embody wider political constraints and
objectives. However, the record of poor growth of
sub-Saharan African economies suggests that
inadequate attention has been given to policies to
increase the efficiency of resource use and that
action to correct this situation is urgently called
for.
Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: an
Agenda for Action [World Bank 1981:2,24]
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the
reality of others may be - can only be transformed
by detailed knowledge of it, by our own effort, by
our own sacrifices.
Amilcar Cabral, late President PAIGC
People . . . must be able to control their own
activities within the framework of their
communities. At present the best intentioned
governments - my own included - too readily
move from a conviction of the need for rural
development into acting as if the people had no
ideas of their own. This is quite wrong. . . people do
know what their basic needs are . . if they have
sufficient freedom they can be relied upon to
determine their own priorities for development.
President J, K. Nyerere
What Is Common Ground?
Precisely because many aspects of the Accelerated
Development Report's agricultural vision and pre-
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scription are controversial, it is important to list areas
of fairly broad agreement which exist among its
authors and enthusiasts as well as its sceptics and
critics. It is clear that common ground is wide,
especially in the identification of broad problem areas.
These include the following:
First, the production record for the region, and for
almost all countries in it, between 1970-79, is poor.
Growth of food for domestic use was half that of
population, and growth of industrial/export crop
output still lower, indeed negative for the region as a
whole. The data in the Annex and the FAO tables
(pages 46 and 50) demonstrate this quite clearly, even
though they also demonstrate by their gross
divergence how weak and conflicting the data are.
What is not, perhaps, adequately stressed in the
Report is how diverse trends are among countries and,
within many, how much divergence there is from crop
to crop.
Second, external factors have played a major
negative role. The Bank cites (chapter 3, pages 48-9)
wars and civil strife; drought and poor rainfall
patterns; and extension of cultivation into less
productive and more drought-prone areas. Most
observers would also cite external terms of trade shifts
(which provide a negative price incentive if passed on).
The Bank's data which show these as positive for
agricultural exports prior to 1978 (pages 18-21) is
questionable since much is based on global averages
(given weak national data) and does not seem to
square with fragmentary national data. However,
between 1977-82 (and for mineral exporters between
1970-8 2) there is agreement that global terms of trade
shifts were highly negative. The unfortunate make-up
of African non-fuel exports (concentrated in low
global demand growth products) is also an agreed
negative external (or at least inherited) factor.
Third, it is critical to raise production of both
domestic food and export/industrial crops. The
Bank's target is 3.8 per cent overall for agriculture
(probably 3.5 per cent food and 4.0 per cent
export/industrial - page 122). The area of divergence
is concealed, for the Agenda totally avoids considering
distributional aspects lucidly or even coherently.
Apparently it believes output growth can or should
come primarily from existing better off smaliholders
(page 52).
Fourth, incentives - both price and non-price, are
needed. But in its chapter on agriculture this Agenda
deals only with incentives which are directly
agricultural (health, water, education, for example,
are excluded). Such an approach may be seen as both
too economistic and too narrowly sectoral, even to
encourage cost efficiency of incentives used to raise
production.
Fifth, peasant.participation in decision-making and
policy design is cited en passant as a key goal. How
common this ground is remains unclear. There is little
real articulation. The whole thrust of the chapter bears
few marks of having used surveys of peasant opinion,
or having designed policies in terms of testing them
against, or modifying them in light of peasant
preferences.
Sixth, the need to select clear priorities (and
therefore to choose and to exclude) and to articulate
policies, programmes, projects from them is broadly
agreed. The divergencies are on what the priorities are
and how much they vary among themselves.
Seventh, there are significant, remediable public
policy inefficiencies in two senses: inconsistencies
within policy/programme/project packages and the
use of more scarce resources than are needed to carry
out policies (including commercial institutional
performance). However, to the extent that judgments
on priorities diverge, a third category of inefficiencies,
namely wrong priorities and/or objectives, may not be
common ground.
Eighth, more data are needed, a point which the
Report repeatedly stresses. It is not clear what is
happening, because present qualitative and quantit-
ative data are of dubious quality, fragmentary and
inconsistent.' Without more data, analyses of the
same events will often be quite different on factual as
well as normative grounds, and unduly open to the
convictions which govern the analyst's selection
'Thus there are alternative 1970-80 annual agricultural output
growth estimates for Tanzania from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent. (An
ongoing detailed FAO study seems to be coming out in the 2.5 to
3 per Cent range - Agenda uses 1.5 per Cent.)
2 Contrast Wallace [1980] with Agenda (p 53) on World Bank
Northern Nigeria Agricultural Projects. Neither is non-partisan and
both have selective empirical data (not all of which can be correct!)
on 'their side'. Or Green [1982] on external causes of agricultural
crises, weaknesses in present capitalist and socialist approaches and
priorities with those of Agenda analysis. Again, neither is unbiased,
and both are generalising from a very incomplete and doubtfully
accurate set of observations (quantitative and qualitative).
among inconsistent data.2 As a direct result more data
are needed to be even reasonably certain of key
priorities, much less their articulation, and a fortiori
measurement and evaluation of future results which
would allow for more coherent strategy in the future
through project testing and adjustment.
Ninth, more knowledge is needed. Packages of
knowledge/physical inputs/technology to raise net
real output per worker simply do not exist in more
than a handful of cases (and equally few adequate
delivery systems for what do exist, pages 69-76). In its
World Development Report ¡982 the Bank has
upgraded this to the main reason for poor
performance - a distinct shift from the analysis
contained in the Agenda.
And So To Implement
Unfortunately, the real and apparent breadth of
common ground does not allow any user of the
Accelerated Development Report to move directly to
implementation. This is not for want of a wide range of
proposals (including virtually all those to which the
present author or most critics would give high
priority). This Agenda proposes almost all plausible
lines of action with no systematic setting of priorities
except in the vaguest terms, and with careful 'let out'
exception citation (eg pages 50-2 on smaliholder
emphasis, but not always or only smaliholders).
Certainly, no coherent presentation of a consistent
priority package and the first stages of articulation is
achieved. At most the success and debacle examples
illustrate particular policies or approaches in
particular contexts. Furthermore the Agenda is not
really consistent. For example, it havers on food self-
sufficiency, intuitively supporting it, almost pulling
back (eg page 65) on the basis of its commitment to
letting short run global market prices decide and
pushing exports, and also arguing (pages 62-3) that
food and export/industrial crops are complementary
anyhow.3
These limitations would not matter if theAgenda were
consistently seen as a set of suggestions and insights
from which, and on the basis of which, to analyse and
act in the divergent contexts of different African
economies. Admittedly the Report says this at times
(eg in President Clausen's 'Foreword'), but the overall
tone is one of a direct guide to immediate, relatively
uniform action. The latter is certainly how proponents
- including the Bank - seek to use the Agenda.
Finally, the common ground is not universal. Some of
the proposals seem to be either impossible (for
While this may well be true in some contexts it is clearly not always
the case (cg cashew versus traditional grains and legumes in
Tanzania) and really begs the relative price question.
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example, raising real agricultural prices in a context of
falling national per capita consuming power);
ímplausible (for example, raising domestic real prices
for export crops whose world market purchasing
power is declining sharply); highly contentious on past
empirical evidence (for example, the sectoral macro-
economic efficiency of private road haulage and
marketing);4 or involve very high-risk for example,
export crop emphasis in the face of low - 1.6 per cent
- projected demand growth (page 23) and highly
shaky (indeed altered by the Bank in 1981 as the
Report appeared!) positive terms of trade shift
projections (page 22). This is not a case for inaction.
Whatever is desirable, continuation of the l970s
pattern of policy and performance is impossible given
present fiscal and import constraints. It is also highly
undesirable given the typically low growth rates of
output and the present external balance and terms of
trade contexts. For these reasons, among others,
dialogue on the Agenda should be both extensive and
intensive, articulative and quizzical before any
country designs its own Agenda for Action.
Incentives - a Perspective
The importance of incentives is not a matter open to
debate. Nor is the importance of material incentives
and participation. The divergence is on which
incentives are most cost-effective and how to package
them in specific contexts.
The Agenda defines an 'incentive structure' as: 'all
those aspects of the farmer's environment which affect
his willingness to produce and sell', and lists price,
marketing, input and consumer goods prices and
availability and participation. It quite overtly
concentrates on selected aspects of prices and
marketing (pages 53-5).
This approach poses certain general problems. First,
the coverage is rather narrowly sectoral and
economistic. Cost (in time or money) of fuel and water
would seem critical incentives to, or constraints on,
production; but they are not treated in this context. If
peasant answers to open-ended questions are to be
believed, access to education and health services are
often crucial incentives (or their absence key
disincentives) to staying in agriculture. Second,
incentive packages may not operate by simple
addition (the combinations as well as the elements
probably matter). Third, the empirical data on
incentives and performance are not such as to permit
multiple regression to weight incentives separately,
and often are inexplicable without further data.
This is quite different from the question of whether they are flexibly
profit oriented. That can mean concentration on the 'best business'
and the highest profit margins with no gain to overall transport
efficiency or peasant share of final market price.
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Fourth, cost efficient/possible packages and the
changes needed to achieve them vary from country to
country (and over time).
Price Incentives: Complexities, Ambiguities,
Limits
Real prices paid for most African woducers' crops fell
during 1970-79 (and during 1979-82). Within this
general decline real prices for domestic food crops fell
more slowly (or in some cases, such as Tanzania
during 1975-81, rose sharply even at official prices).
Real prices for export crops usually plummeted and,
with few and brief exceptions, exhibited a downward
trend. In general both trends paralleled the evolution
of prices at the global level.
In most cases, official farm-gate prices (and probably
private and parallel market prices as well) fell as a
percentage of wholesale or export proceeds. Real unit
costs of other elements (including administration,
storage, spoilage, interest charges) also rose, in many
cases for reasons including patent inefficiency.
Export taxes (at least since 1977 and dramatically
since 1979) have declined as a share of fob value. This
has reversed the earlier rise cited in the Agenda
(page 55). Farm-gate food prices are now usually
above import parity less farm-gate to market costs
(which is far more than the older data on page 65
suggest), albeit they are often below parallel market
prices.5 Profits of marketing bodies have become
virtually historic memory, large losses are typical. In a
number of cases post-1979 farm-gate price as a share
of final price has risen, but this is due to cuts in export
tax and rises in marketing body losses.
These generalisations appear to hold for most
countries with no particular correlation to economic
strategy (see Harvey's article on Malawi which reveals
smallholder results radically worse than the small-
holder/plantation data contained in Table SA, p 3 of
the Report, which itself shows little correlation with
domestic barter terms of trade by either ideology or
performance).
The practicable lines of response to an admittedly
unsatisfactory pattern are - perhaps contrary to what
a quick reading of the Agenda suggests - neither
self-evident nor simple. Simply raising prices does
little good in a context of extreme real resource
scarcity, when accelerated inflation rapidly moves one
back to square one.6 Nor are appropriate patterns of
'Though not always. In the second quarter of 1982 parallel market
rice in Dar es Salaam sold at or below the official price, and during
the 1976-78 surplus years this was frequently true for maize and
sembe in much of the country.
6Agenda sometimes speaks of prices unmodified, but presumably
means real prices throughout in its discussion of incentives. Few
African smallholders can have many money illusions left!
Most peasant agriculture involves hard work, uncertainty and low incomes. (Cotton picking in Mali)
relative price changes among crops clear, except after
the event in the case of massive inefficient relativities.
The first problem is getting usable elasticity estimates.
What is demonstrated clearly is that cross elasticities
are often high, even in the short run. Therefore if a
price shift from one crop to another would clearly
benefit value o!1 output and reduce the trade deficit, it
is fairly unambiguously desirable (for example, the
radical post-1979 boosting of relative and real cashew
nut prices in Tanzania). But cross-elasticities do not
appear to be uniform by crop, by place or over time,
nor are the estimates available accurate enough for
anything beyond identifying gross mistakes.
Whether elasticity of total output to average real
prices is high (it is almost certainly positive) is less
clear. This is recognised (page 55 - especially note 14
of the Report); but not always in summary references,
(as, for example, page 61). African smallholder
agriculture does not have generalised surplus labour
and inputs. National resource and external imbalance
constraints preclude massive increases in capital or
recurrent input intensity across the board. Certainly in
some contexts - which need to be identified
specifically - significant overall output responses
should be attainable.
Pan-territorial pricing to make production for sale in
outlying areas viable and give a vent for surplus labour
and land (à la Adam Smith) is the most evidently
7This has been a secondary reason for its use - bolstering cash
income of poor peasants in disadvantaged areas has been more
influential.
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cost/output efficient use of real price rises;7 but is
condemned by the Accelerated Development Report
(pages 66-7). Certainly this approach raises average
transport (and therefore foreign exchange) costs per
unit produced (and in extreme cases can represent a
subsidy of 100 per cent of grower price); but in cases as
diverse as Malawi and Tanzania, it has been very
effective in creating new stable sources of marketed
staple foodstuffs. It is not necessarily inconsistent with
incentives for regional specialisation. It makes full
privatisation of marketing impossible, but not de-
centralisation and/or privatisation of short and
medium distance marketing. While this price tool
offers no panacea and is sometimes too costly, it is
appropriate to some contexts.
The second problem is what can be done to raise
average real prices. Marketing agency books already
use gallons of red ink (as do government recurrent
budgets). In most countries real national per capita
purchasing power (constant price GNP adjusted for
terms of trade losses) is falling. In order to raise real
farm-gate prices it is necessary either to reduce the real
income of some other sub-class or cut downstream
costs.
Real wages and salaries have fallen much more than
real grower prices in at least some cases (for example,
Tanzania 1975-82, possibly Malawi 1973-80) during
the 1970s. So have urban 'informal' sector incomes.
Considerations of equity, economic prudence and
socio-political stability foreclose major shifts (eg a
30 per cent real wage cut to cover a 20 per cent real
grower price increase).
Cost reduction (especially in administration, physical
loss, malfeasance and wasteful use of transport) is not
in principal controversial.8 However, interest (which
the Bank wants raised), fuel and vehicle costs, as well
as storage (which need more resources to reduce loss)
are not easily reduced; nor are processing, wholesale
and retail margins. Over a three to five year period
with maximum political commitment and extensive
use of first rate administrators, managers and
accountants, a five to ten per cent gain in farm-gate
prices (far less than present marketing loss in many
cases) could be clawed back. That is worth having, but
it is a limited gain as an overall production incentive.
Price certainty is generally agreed to be an incentive. It
is an incentive inconsistent with full privatisation,
which would entail prices swinging with import and
export parity. Government minimum price announce-
ments one or two years in advance of harvest; a buyer
Certain beneficiaries of these costs will resist, but that is not a reason
for not trying.
In both Kenya and Tanzania lower coffee prices in 1976 and 1977
with the held back port9ion used to soften 1978-79 and 1980-81 falls
would seem likely to have had better incentive results than near
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and storer of last resort capacity; and a means
(whether in a marketing board, a fund or by fiscal
means to smooth sharp swings)9 would appear the
minimum for achieving this price incentive.
Marketing - Availability and Cost
The greatest price disincentive is not being sure where,
when or whether there will be a buyer and whether he
will pay promptly. That test is, to a greater or lesser
degree, failed by most public sector (and some private
sector) marketing institutions. (Malawi is an exception.
During 1975-78, but not since, sowas Tanzania's grain
marketing corporation.) In both cases officially
marketed grain output rose. Further, ensuring that
buying points within range of farmers exist, having
personnel to buy at convenient scheduled times and
pay cash (at least a substantial downpayment with a
lower quality, or export price-related second payment)
is neither administratively nor financially impossible,
if it is given top priority. The Agenda does not
contradict this assertion but it does not stand out as a
clear priority among its barrage of detailed notes and
proposals on incentives.
Similarly, the case for decentralisation to reduce
transport costs, allow local selling price differentiation,
reduce institutional dis-economies of scale and
complexity would seem to follow from pages 58-61
where this issue is compared with the less than
identical one of privatisation. Decentralisation can be
in the public, the co-operative or the private sector.
Oddly, it has not to date enjoyed much external agency
support when proposed in the public sector.tO
As argued in the Agenda (pp 64-9), a mixed
public/private marketing system is appropriate.
Arguments turn on the mix and on the real efficiency
of the private sector in terms of farmer incomes and
scarce resource use. On the latter, the Agenda gives a
somewhat too general and too roseate picture.
Certainly for some crops the private sector does have
lower scarce resource costs, and pays at least the same
price to the grower as the public sector even
abstracting from physical shortage factors, as for
example, rice in Tanzania cited earlier. However, this
may not be general. For the two staple, widely
marketed, food crops in Tanzania - cooking bananas
doubling and subsequent halving of real grower prices during
1975-79, albeit the force of this argument is reduced by the 4.8 per
cent average annual growth rate in Tanzanian coffe production over
1975/76 - 1980/81 (both ecological cycle peak years and poor price
years).
'°i has been particularly true of AID and JBRD advice in
Tanzania in respect to the purchase and sale of main exports and
grain, but in transport the Bank is now supporting regional public
lorry companies.
"This may be caused by very high private marketing profits, but these
do not increase smallholders' incentives and their subsequent
impact on demand for scarce resources is ambiguous.
and Irish potatoes - for which no public sector or
large private sector buyers exist, preliminary evidence
suggests a lower ratio of farm-gate to consumer price
than for public sector marketed staples."
Price stabilisation (or smoothing); pan-territorial
grower prices; ensuring coverage of low volume or
inaccessible areas; management of price and access
during physical scarcity; intra-year reserve storage
and planning/handling of deficits by bulk forward
import purchases; are either unattractive to the private
sector (inefficient for maximising profit) or beyond
the capacity of African economy private sectors or
both. They can however, be critical to national output
levels and to social stability as well as to equity. Use of
private agents and contractors, decentralisation of
local purchases and sales (subject to maximum
consumer and minimum farm-gate profits) and some
legal parallel private marketing in long-distance
domestic grain trade on the other hand deserve case by
case attention.
If a pure buyer and supplier of last resort role (with
associated import, export and storage functions) is
assigned to the public sector (as Agenda appears to
advocate), it will suffer losses whatever its efficiency,
because it has been allocated all the unprofitable
functions, and the private sector almost all those
which are profitable.
From Producer to Available Transport and
Storage
Transport problems are analogous to those of
marketing. Clear inefficiencies exist both in pure waste
of resources (eg cross-hauls, empty back loads, pure
scarcity rent payments to hauliers, excessive vehicle
down-time) and in the continuation of patterns which
made sense before the fuel and vehicle price explosions
of 1973-80. These require case by case identification
- especially to see how to correct them - although
tto
Modern, mechanised agriculture is usually cost-inefficient (especially
at present fuel prices) and suffers from import constraints on spares.
(Grounded tractor in Upper Volta)
problems such as inadequate spares imports are fairly
general.
Public/private issues, again, are not subject either to
simple generalisation or to black and white solutions.
Private hauliers in transport scarcity conditions can
both secure pure rents (exploit users) and reduce risk
by refusing to venture off main roads. If adequate
foreign exchange to 'flood' the haulage market is
absent, the public sector, faute de mieux, ends up
handling the least profitable and trickiest sectors.
Decentralisation provides part of the answer -
perhaps to rural communities or village-based small
businessmen, both of which have some successes on
record.
Storage is not mentioned as a priority on the Agenda.
This is perhaps because intra-year reserve stocks are
rejected in a way which totally ignores transport cost
issues, especially for landlocked states (p69). But main
commercial grain system annual losses run as high as
15 per cent (Tanzania 1978-79) and as low as 1.5 per
cent (Zimbabwe 1980-81)for reasons which appear to
be subject to correction at bearable capital and
operating costs. What technology is appropriate
probably varies. Expert promotion of both high
(central silo) and low (tarpaulins over slabs)
technology appoaches has led to debacles, sometimes
by successive adoption of both approaches.'2 Again,
decentralisation with basic storage near purchase
point until location of user is known, seems critical in
order to reduce back and forth haulage associated
with moving food in to central stores and out again to
users (eg Zambia, Tanzania, Sahel).
Marketing, transport and storage have still not
adjusted to four factors: urban population growth as a
share of total population (eg three per cent to 15-20 per
cent in Tanzania, and 15 per cent to 45 per cent in
Zambia during 1960-80); greater swings in output
around average levels; longer runs of good and bad
years; and radically increased real transport costs. The
first three require additional annual throughput and
intra-year storage capacity. The last alter appropriate
patterns and modes of transport in ways which are
structural, not marginal. Unfortunately there has been
very little research in this context and the Report does
not even identify these issues in any systematic way.
Research, Extension, Inputs and All That
Research, extension and input supply are on the
Agenda (pp 69-76). Their weaknesses and the costs
these entail are noted. A working list of things to be
done is presented. Some are probably candidates for
1 In Tanzania, 1976-79 grain storage losses (spoilt, deteriorated and
fed to poultry, exported at heavy loss to avoid spoilage) totalled
about 600,000 tonnes - equal to 1979-81 maize imports.
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general articulation into policy and practice, for
example, improved seed (p 73) and small-scale
irrigation (p 80). Coverage is ultimately deeply
depressing and unimpressive however. All the themes
could be - and were - set out two decades ago and
have been regularly repeated since. Apparently the
Report's writers (like other analysts) are no nearer
answers than the authors of the Bank's 1950s country
studies of African economies. Furthermore, there is
no coherent selection of priorities, no clear linking to
other aspects of incentives (eg price); no indication
that fuel, health, adult education, and water supply are
interlocked sectorally with agricultural research and
extension; either in terms of incentives to farmers or
the provision of rural services)3
Most criticisms of existing approaches are fair, but
what is less clearly stated is that most known
practicable options have been tried and also failed.
For example, at least one African state has totally
reorganised extension three times (a fourth is being
considered) in a cyclical fashion over 20-odd years,
under expert international advice. What remained
' Indeed the repeated call (cg pp 42,84) for charging for health,
education and drinking water (usually very administration intensive
and cost-inefficient as central government revenue sources) hardly
seems a positive incentive to rural residents, and oddly, is not
paralleled by any plea to charge for research and extension services.
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unchanged was that, except for three crops (coffee,
tobacco, tea) and a few local cases, agricultural
extension and research had the lowest demonstrable
benefit/cost ratios in evidence of any large government
expenditure head.
One of the Report's most useful statements (p 70) is
that in Africa there are few packages of inputs/
technique changes which are tested, practicable,
economically viable and related to local (often very
local) contexts, and equally few effective delivery/
extension systems. What is needed - and lacking - is
identification of priority sub-areas which show
promise of quick payoff and articulation of a longer-
term approach to achieving broader breakthroughs.
African Agriculture, Aid Agencies and
Expertise
The need for more external involvement in African
agricultural decision making, personnel provision and
finance is stressed as part of the Agenda. 1f one is to
take the tone of the Report's agricultural chapter as a
guide, this is a polite way of calling for an externally
led platonic guardianship team of aid agencies
coordinated by the World Bank. That approach poses
problems. African agricultural policy and practice
Agricultural improvements which are financially viable and technically feasible are welcomed by most rural Africans. (Small scale irrigation,
Zimbabwe)
In one case a parallel agency was 'subcontracted' national
agricultural price, parastatal control and planning, crop forecasting
and target setting and citizen policy/planning personnel develop-
ment. Over five years it operated autonomously with its advice acted
on. Agricultural prices became markedly less consistent (destroying
the third ranking agricultural export), in all but one case parastatal
financial and physical control collapsed, huge storage losses
emerged, no decentralised crop targets were set, senior citizen
personnel in the ministry were marginalised and demoralised and
the ministry nationally discredited. During 1980-82 citizen ministers
and officials clawed back control to the ministry and the overall
policy process in the face of external agency opposition, but getting
back to square one will take at least five years.
The costs of these weaknesses have been, and remain,
high.'4 They are not the result of ill-will or general
incompetence. To examine them openly, frankly and
analytically is vital if external cooperation is to be
more useful in the future. The Agenda makes no such
general analysis, but argues for minor changes within
what appears to be the same old framework. This is
counterproductive for two reasons. To understand the
past is vital to avoid repeating it. Further, the
credibility and acceptability of the Bank's (or any
other cooperating agency's) new advice is heavily
dependent on admitting its own past mistakes, and
showing how its new approaches will avoid repeating
them.
Some Overall Questions and Doubts
The Report calls for an agricultural export-led growth
strategy based on raising African shares of slowly
growing markets and depending on favourable terms
of trade evolution for coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco and
cotton. At least on one plausible reading, it advocates
raising export crop relative to domestic food crop
prices, and reducing priority to food self-sufficiency. If
it works this would be admirable, but:
the Bank has reversed its projections on terms of
trade improvement for these crops;
the global price projections do not assume a
doubling of the growth rate in African output; if
they did, future price trends would be radically
lower;
Africa as a region has market shares above price
elasticities. Thus for all African exporters taken
together faster volume growth means lower
revenue. This suggests that the approach
inherently rests on a 'fallacy of composition';
speedy, smooth shifts from food to exports are
unlikely; bad years for domestic food crops, and
years in which food prices explode globally are
likely to recur.
Therefore, for many African economies, whole-
hearted acceptance of a shift to an agricultural exports
strategy would probably be a recipe for starvation.
The tendency to generalise across diversity warps the
private/public sector and free managed market
discussion. Few of the tables show much correlation
between economic ideology or interventionism and
overall agricultural output growth. The variations are
much more complex than that. Equally, the short-run
cost of radical shifts on the public/private margin is
high (as the more evangelistic proponents of each
often forget, but as Robert McNamara recently
stressed). Far firmer evidence and clearer identification
of specific shifts required in concrete contexts is
crucial before action can safely or responsibly be taken.
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has, in the majority of countries, been more studied,
planned, advised on, staffed at the policy level and in
general shaped by external agencies than any other
sector. The results do not, automatically, suggest that
'more of the same' is a plausible answer in this aspect
of policy any more than in most others. Several
weaknesses have been common (some noted in
chapter 9 of the Report):
low effective emphasis on smaliholder agri-
culture and domestic food production;
inconsistent, rapidly changing price policy
advice based on models and whims more than
analysis and incentives;
a rigidly technocratic, bureaucratic structure
unable to communicate with, much less learn
from, peasants and often marginalising -
rather than developing - local expertise;
creation of a plethora of agency-linked projects
fragmenting any national sectoral approach;
failure to integrate marketing-transport-storage
into overall agricultural development, and a
tendency to treat rural health-education-water-
fuel-participatory institution building either as
trivial optional additions or as no part of a
general agriculturaVrural development nexus;
creation of parallel planning, policy and
operational institutions with autonomy from
political economy, government and local
control, but linked to, and dependent on, the
agencies (which the Agenda denounces on
pp 13 1-2 without indicating that the Bank has
played a leading role in creating many of them);
a tendency to centralise all aspects of agriculture
(in order to keep it in expert, technical hands)
even when smaller, more decentralised units
within a clear policy frame would seem more
efficient ex ante and even more ex post (again an
area in which the Agenda, especially in chapter 9,
reverses past Bank advice without saying so);
a remarkably high proportion of bad economic
and technical advice (related to failure to build
up an analytical and data base, or even in many
cases to see the need for local ones) versus 'off
the shelf model and technology imports.
Failure to include fuel-water-health-education factors
among incentives; to treat distribution questions with
any seriousness; to consider how technical and
narrowly economic policy considerations interact
with political-economic factors; to give any avowal to
the need for peasant participation; or to consider the
tensions between the technocratic-economistic-
foreign expert centred Agenda and genuine partici-
pation, are not marginal. Unless and until they are
tackled, together with the agricultural production-
procurement-pricing-institution issues covered (in
chapter 5), no coherent sectoral strategy, priority
package and articulated programme of action can be
built. This Agenda could not fairly be expected to have
built such strategies, priorities, or programmes. It
could, however, have provided fuller coverage of the
necessary components; by way of dialogue posed
options; and explicitly cited basic (not merely
38
secondary) uncertainties. The impression it gives of
comprehensiveness, certainty and revealed wisdom
are counterproductive for its intended contribution to
rehabilitating and revitalising agricultural sectors in
SSA countries.
References
World Bank, 1981, Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan
Africa: an Agenda for Action, Washington
1982, World Development Report 1982, Washington
Wallace, T., 1980, 'Agricultural projects in Northern Nigeria',
Review of African Political Economy, no 17
Green, R. H., 1982, 'Agricultural crises in sub-Saharan
Africa: captitalism and transitions to socialism' in Agri-
culture, the Peasantry and Socialist Development, Bulletin,
vol 13 no 4, IDS, Sussex
